Intuition and intellect

Intuition and intellect

Most theorists agree that music is an auditory phenomenon and that hearing is the beginning of understanding. Beyond this there is little agreement. There is bad blood especially between proponents of intuition, like Benedetto Croce, and champions of intellectual cognition, like Hospers. Gurney was constrained to postulate a special musical faculty that need not reside exclusively either in the mind or the heart. The main problem for theorists arises from the inveterate tendency to dichotomize thought and feeling. Henri Bergson (1859–1941) broke with this tradition when he spoke for “an intellectual act of intuition.” Recently, a reawakened philosophic and artistic concern for the concept of organic unity has revealed strong affinities among such disparate works as Gurney's The Power of Sound (1880); the U.S. philosopher Susanne K. Langer's Philosophy in a New Key (1942) and her later works; John Dewey's classic Art as Experience (1934); and the U.S. composer Roger Sessions' The Musical Experience (1950).

It is apparent that music is connected in some way with the emotional life of man, but the “how” continues to be elusive. Sessions (echoing Aristotle) states the problem fairly:

No one denies that music arouses emotions, nor do most people deny that the values of music are both qualitatively and quantitatively connected with the emotions it arouses. Yet it is not easy to say just what this connection is.

It was long fashionable to speak of the “language” of music, or of music as the “language of the emotions,” but since a precise semantics is wanting in music, the analogy breaks down. Two or more listeners may derive very different “meanings” from the same piece of music, and since written and spoken language cannot render these musical “meanings,” whatever they may be, in consistent and commonly recognizable terms, verbal explication often seems to raise more questions than it settles. Philosophic analysts who hold that all meaning is capable of rendition in language therefore pronounce music—unless it can be saved by the referentialists—without meaning, confronting the thoughtful listener, thereby, with a proposition that seems clearly to contradict (and trivialize) his own experience. The difficulty, of course, is a semantic one and explains why some theorists substitute such terms as import, significance, pattern, or gestalt for meaning. Recognizing an incompatibility between the modalities of nonverbal arts and their treatment by discursive thought, it is hardly surprising that musical aestheticians have been few.